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About this Report 
 
n today’s media systems, large numbers of ordinary citizens circulate political information 
with great regularity. As a consequence, false and misleading information, whether it 
originates with elites or non-elites, can become widely distributed—and quickly. Now, people 
may be more likely to encounter false and misleading information on a daily basis. So if we 
really want to get to the root of the problem of so-called “fake news” we need to better 
understand why so many people will readily share false and misleading information online. 
Exploring why, and with what effects, people share news about politics on social media is 
therefore an essential part of the broader debate about the relationship between the internet 
and democracy. The healthy functioning of liberal democracies relies upon citizens whose role 
is to learn about the social and political world, exchange information and opinions with fellow 
citizens, arrive at considered judgments about public affairs, and put these judgments into 
action as political behaviour. 
The problem is that we currently know very little about the motivations that drive people to 
share political news on social media and how these might be contributing to changes in our 
online civic culture. If we can learn more about the things people try to achieve when they share 
news online—and the extent to which these motivations might reinforce or undermine the 
distribution of false or misleading information—liberal democracies can start to think about how 
they can reduce important online harms. 
This report is the first to address these issues in Britain on the basis of a survey of the 
news sharing habits on social media of a representative sample of the British public. 
 
  
I 
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Summary of Key Findings 
 
 
§ More than half of British social media users (57.7 percent) came across news 
in the past month on social media that they thought was not fully accurate. 
 
§ 42.8 percent of news sharers admit to sharing inaccurate or false news; 17.3 
percent admit to sharing news they thought was made up when they shared 
it. These users are more likely to be male, younger, and more interested in 
politics. 
 
§ A substantial amount of the sharing on social media of inaccurate or made 
up news goes unchallenged. Fewer social media users (33.8 percent) report 
being corrected by other social media users than admit to sharing false or 
exaggerated news (42.8 percent). And 26.4 percent of those who shared 
inaccurate or made up news were not corrected. There are some grounds for 
optimism if we see this particular glass as half full: after all, almost three 
quarters of respondents who shared news that was exaggerated or made up 
also reported being reprimanded by other social media users. 
 
§ However, the most problematic news sharing does not stimulate many social 
media users to correct the sharers: in total, only 8.5 percent of British social 
media users said that they reprimanded another social media user for sharing 
news that was made up. 
 
§ Those who share news on social media are mainly motivated to inform others 
and express their feelings, but more civically-ambivalent motivations also 
play an important role. For example, almost a fifth of news sharers (18.7 
percent) see upsetting others as an important motivation when they share 
news. 
 
§ There are some partisan differences in sharing inaccurate or made up news 
on UK social media. Conservative supporters, and those with right-wing 
ideological beliefs, are more likely to share inaccurate news; they are also 
more likely to be reprimanded by others for doing so. Labour supporters, and 
those who hold left-wing ideological beliefs, are more likely to see inaccurate 
news and to correct other social media users for sharing it. 
 
§ About one-third (31 percent) of British social media users share news on 
social media at least once a month. The demographic and behavioural profile 
of these users resembles that of the most politically active members of the 
general public—they are more likely to be male, have higher educational 
attainment, and be more interested in politics—although younger people are 
more likely than older people to share news. 
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1. Introduction 
 
e are now in the midst of an important public debate about the extent to which social 
media platforms are contributing to the spread of false and misleading information.1 
Many commentators have argued that social media are playing a role in the 
development of a new political culture animated by a wilful disregard for the truth. In the long 
term, if left unchecked, these developments will make it more difficult for societies to operate 
on the basis of important liberal democratic principles: authenticity, rationality, tolerance, trust, 
and the recognition and institutional integration of political differences. 
We see this as a debate about online civic culture.2 Online civic culture refers to the cultural 
expectations, norms of behaviour, and social, economic, and technological incentive structures 
that shape how people behave online. Changes over time in these expectations, norms, and 
incentive structures mean that online civic culture is constantly evolving. But importantly, there 
will occasionally be key transition periods, during which there are decisive breaks with the past 
and when changes in online civic culture become embedded in ways that reconfigure aspects 
of liberal democracy. The online civic cultures of liberal democracies around the world are 
arguably going through such a transition. One challenge for social science is how to develop 
independent, evidence-based analysis of this shift’s most significant features and likely long-
term consequences, while avoiding hurried calls for government action on the basis of patchy 
or inapposite evidence. 
 
 
2. Threats to Online Civic Culture 
 
Liberal democracies now feature political communication environments in which people are 
much freer to engage in three interconnected types of action that are reshaping online civic 
culture in negative ways.  
The first of these is action deliberately designed to spread false or misleading information in 
ways that promote ignorance, misunderstanding, conflict, division, and intolerance. 
The second is action that, for various reasons, results in the inadvertent spread of false or 
misleading information.  
The third—and in our view the most damaging—is action that aims to foster cynicism and 
detachment by undermining trust in the very possibility that citizens can come together, agree 
on basic definitions of truth and falsehood, engage in meaningful discussion, and solve 
important social and political problems. 
 
 
3. Sharing News on Social Media: Why It Matters for Online 
Civic Culture 
 
In contrast with the broadcast media era, large numbers of ordinary citizens now circulate 
political news, and with great regularity. As a consequence, false and misleading information, 
whether it originates with political elites or non-elites, can become widely distributed—and 
quickly. Now that so many receive their news from interactions on social media, people are 
more likely to encounter false and misleading information on a daily basis. If we really want to 
get to the root of the problem of so-called “fake news” we need to better understand why so 
many people will readily share false and misleading information online. 
The forces underlying the recent shifts in our political communication environment are 
complex and manifold.3 But a salient theme in current debates is well-known to researchers of 
W 
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online communication, even if they have sometimes disagreed about the overall implications. It 
is that many of the constraints that typically shape face-to-face communication apply only 
weakly in online settings. In social media interactions, anonymity or pseudonymity are 
widespread, or people use their real identities but have weak or no social ties with many of 
those with whom they discuss politics. As a result, when interacting on social media, people 
are generally more likely to question authority, disclose more information, and worry less about 
facing reprisals for their behaviour. The fact that many social media users feel less bounded by 
authority structures and reprisals does not necessarily lead to democratically undesirable 
interactions. Social media environments encourage the expression of legitimate but 
underrepresented views and the airing of grievances that are not addressed by existing 
communicative structures. However, social media may afford a political communication 
environment in which it is easier than ever to circulate ideas, and signal behavioural norms, that 
may, depending on the specific context, undermine the relational bonds required for tolerance 
and trust.4 
Exploring how, why, and with what effects people share news on social media is therefore 
an essential part of the broader debate about the internet and democracy. The healthy 
functioning of liberal democracies relies upon citizens whose role is to learn about the social 
and political world, exchange information and opinions with others, arrive at considered 
judgments about public affairs, and put these judgments into action as political behaviour. 
In the UK context, where the non-public service media are divided on partisan lines, purely 
fabricated news is just one part of a spectrum of information that is problematic for the 
maintenance of liberal democratic norms. Information that is exaggerated, sensationalized, 
selective, or assembled from a web of partial truths, compiled from reputable and less 
reputable sources, has long been a key force in British public life and this kind of information is 
alive and well in today’s media system. All of this means that false and misleading information is 
often introduced by political and media actors of various kinds, for a variety of strategic 
reasons, before being shared across social media and private messaging by a wide range of 
individuals and organizations.5 
News sharing on social media is implicated in all three of the threats that are negatively 
reshaping online civic culture. Those who seek to promote intolerance and misunderstanding 
share narratives and examples from news reports to try to sow division among different social 
and cultural groups. They invoke the authoritative status of journalism to deflect attention from 
the problematic nature of the content they share; others, who may share false or misleading 
information without realising it, may be convinced by these signals of authority. And those who 
seek to undermine trust in the very possibility that citizens can engage in meaningful discussion 
about politics will try to spread information designed to distract and confuse, to chip away at 
the minimal shared understandings required for political discussion. 
 
3.1 People, Motivations, and Behaviour 
 
The field of online misinformation studies is blossoming, but most of the research to date has 
not focused on the attitudes and behaviour of social media users. There is valuable research on 
the role of automation in deliberate disinformation and on changes in the news and journalism 
industry.6 But there is also a need to understand people—their motivations, and their 
behaviour. 
One problem is that we still know very little about the motivations that drive people to share 
news on social media, and still less about how these motivations are contributing to changes in 
online civic culture. If we can learn more about the things people try to achieve when they share 
news, and the extent to which these motivations might reinforce or undermine the distribution 
of false or misleading information, we can start to think about how we might reduce these 
important online harms. 
Social media platforms are fundamentally interactive, networked environments, where 
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millions of users with diverse interests and goals participate on a daily basis, so the range of 
possible motivations for sharing is very broad. Motivations that obviously link news sharing to 
the performance of citizenship, such as informing others or finding out other people’s opinions, 
have long been seen as important in online life. More recently, however, we have begun to learn 
more about motivations, such as trolling and deliberate attempts to deceive, that have become 
important for online civic culture but which have more ambivalent relationships with liberal 
democratic citizenship. We have also begun to learn more about the challenges of content 
moderation by social media platforms and the often surprising behaviour of people when they 
go online.7 
This report is the first to address these issues in Britain on the basis of a survey of the 
news sharing habits on social media of a representative sample of the British public.  
There are three key questions guiding our study. 
 
3.2 Key Questions 
 
  
§ How widespread is the sharing of false and misleading political news among 
British social media users? 
 
§ To what extent is there a persistent and damaging “anything goes” culture 
among those who share political news on social media? 
 
§ To what extent does the correction of false and misleading news through the 
“wisdom of crowds”—a previously much-lauded feature of the internet—
actually operate on British social media? 
 
 
To answer these questions, we designed a survey and asked Opinium Research to 
administer it to an online sample representative of the UK adult population, based on key 
demographic variables such as age, gender, and region of residence. 2,005 respondents 
completed the questionnaire between July 5–16, 2018.8 
 
 
4. Who Shares Political News and How Regularly? 
 
In this study, we were interested in people’s experiences of sharing news about politics on 
social media. So we began by applying a screening question to filter out the respondents who 
had never used at least one of the four most prominent social media platforms in Britain: 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp. Those who remained after applying this filter we 
call British social media users. Our analysis in this report either focuses on these members of 
the British public or on the sub-group of social media users who share news on social media. 
As Figure 1 shows, of the four platforms, Facebook and WhatsApp are currently by far the 
most popular, followed by Twitter and Instagram. Almost 90 percent of our respondents used 
Facebook, with 46.6 percent saying they used it several times a day; 70.8 percent used 
WhatsApp, with 31 percent saying they used it several times a day. 
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Figure 1. Frequency of Internet and Social Media Use (N=2,005) 
 
 
 
 
Our first aim was to identify the extent to which British social media users share news 
about politics on social media. As Figure 2 shows, about a third (31 percent) of British social 
media users share news at least once a month or more frequently. A substantial minority—20.6 
percent—share news at least once a week or more. Clearly, sharing news about politics has 
become a popular activity among British social media users—perhaps surprisingly so, given the 
wide range of activities possible on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and WhatsApp. 
 
 
Figure 2. News Sharing on Social Media (N=1,903) 
 
 
 
What kinds of people tend to share political news on social media?9 As Figure 3 shows, 
males share news more than females, and by a fairly large margin: while 37.6 percent of the 
male respondents shared news on social media at least once a month, this figure drops to 25.4 
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percent among females. 
There is also a fairly clear age divide. Younger individuals—defined here as those under the 
age of 45—share news more than the over-45s. Those with higher educational attainment also 
generally tend to share more news. 
 
Figure 3. Social and Political Characteristics of News Sharers on Social Media (N=1,903) 
 
 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, people with higher levels of interest in politics share news about 
politics on social media, but there are also some interesting party and ideological divides. 
Labour, UKIP, and Liberal Democrat supporters are more likely to share news on social media 
than Conservative supporters. Those who described themselves as either on the ideological left 
or the ideological right share news more than those at the centre, and overall, those who 
placed themselves to the left and centre-left are more likely to share news than those placing 
themselves to the right and centre-right. We will return to the significance of these party and 
ideological differences later in the report, when we examine how partisan affiliation and ideology 
shape people’s sharing of false and inaccurate news. 
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Overall, when assessed in light of these basic demographic and political characteristics, 
political news sharers bear a strong resemblance to those who tend to be more politically active 
in British society more generally. Social media news sharers tend to have higher educational 
attainment, be more interested in politics, and are more likely to identify with a political party 
than an average member of the public. These are all characteristics that we know from studies 
of political participation, such as the British Election Survey, are associated with higher levels of 
political involvement, such as party membership, campaign volunteering, and voting.10 
It is, however, important to note that, as a group, social media news sharers differ in one 
respect from those among the general population who are politically active: social media news 
sharers tend, on average, to be younger, rather than middle-aged or older. 
 
 
5. What Motivates People to Share Political News on Social 
Media? 
 
Since we are interested in how patterns of sharing news on social media might be embedding 
particular norms online, it is important to consider what motivates British social media users to 
share news about politics. Why do people share news and what do they aim to achieve when 
they share it? 
To find out, we asked those respondents who share news on social media at least once a 
month “When you share news on social media, how important are these different goals to 
you?”. Figure 4 shows the results. 
 
Figure 4. Importance of Different Motivations for Sharing News on Social Media (N=589) 
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The most important motivations for sharing were to express feelings and to inform others. 
In each case, 65.5 percent of social media users who share news considered these goals to be 
very important and somewhat important. Next in importance were the motivations to find out 
other people’s opinions (51.1 percent), to influence others (43.9 percent), and to provoke 
discussions (43.7 percent). It is clear that many see sharing news as a form of self-expression 
but also as a purposive behaviour—a means of stimulating a response or gaining influence over 
other people. These influence-related motivations are particularly important in light of what we 
show later in the report about the extent to which news sharers share news that is false or 
misleading. 
As we go down the hierarchy of motivations in Figure 4, we can identify responses that are 
more civically ambivalent.  
About one-third (33.5 percent) of British social media users who share news say that they 
do so to entertain others. The informal or playful nature of social media interaction is arguably 
what appeals to many people who normally do not engage with mainstream channels of 
political communication. However, those who share news to entertain others may also be less 
careful about the truthfulness of what they share. And those who maliciously share news they 
know to be false may use irony as a rhetorical device to encourage their audiences to lower 
their guards as they assess the quality of the content they share.11 
Almost one-third (29.6 percent) of British news sharers on social media share news to feel 
like they belong to a group. There are, of course, positive democratic benefits of group 
belonging, particularly for building the social solidarity that is essential for collective political 
action.12 Sharing news that sustains a sense of collective agency is an important democratic 
good. At the same time, however, the positive aspects of this behaviour always exist in tension 
with some negative aspects. A concern in current public debate is the role played by social 
media platforms’ algorithmically-generated “feeds” in social, cultural, and political polarisation. 
Feeds have become the central organising experience of most people’s online activity. The 
dominant business model of social media platform companies has been based on selling 
individuals’ attention to advertisers. To this end, companies strive to design user experiences 
that are sufficiently attractive to keep people interacting and sharing information. In practice, 
this has meant that the software algorithms that shape users’ feeds often (though not always) 
tend to reinforce what network scientists call homophily: humans’ long-observed bias toward 
forming bonds with those who are similar to themselves. Those who share news to increase 
their sense of group belonging are perhaps less likely to see the social media environment as 
an opportunity to learn from others and bridge political divisions. They are more likely to see 
their news sharing as a way to advance their own group’s identity and are less likely to be 
interested in engaging with those they consider to be outsiders.13  
A surprisingly large number of British news sharers on social media—18.7 percent—
consider it important to upset others when they share news. This finding speaks to recent 
concerns about how, for some, social media may have contributed to the “coarsening and 
toxifying of our public debate” and made it more acceptable to engage in public discourse that 
is based on intimidation.14 While only a minority shares news to antagonize others, it is, at 
almost a fifth of news sharers, a sizeable minority. 
As with the finding that sharing news is motivated by the desire to belong to a group, there 
is no straightforward relationship between emotional antagonism and online civic culture. 
Outrage is an inescapable part of politics. Upsetting others is often an effective means of 
grabbing people’s attention in a cluttered information environment. And yet, emotions can be 
exclusionary and divisive.15 However, it is the widespread nature of this particular motivation 
that is troubling. If almost one fifth of UK social media users who share news sees upsetting 
others as a distinct priority, a mutually-reinforcing relationship between social media and 
emotional antagonism may become embedded in online civic culture. 
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6. Problematic News Sharing 
 
We have seen that a substantial number of British social media users who share news do so to 
achieve goals that are potentially problematic for online civic culture. But what can we say 
about how people perceive the quality of the news they share? To what extent do British social 
media users share news that is inaccurate, exaggerated, or false? And, to what extent do 
people who share inaccurate, exaggerated, or false news online experience criticism of their 
behaviour from others in their social media networks? 
We start by identifying the overall extent to which problematic news is encountered by 
British social media users. See Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Encountering Problematic News on Social Media (N=2,005) 
 
 
Almost half (45.8 percent) of British social media users said that, in the last month, they 
had often or sometimes seen news on social media that they thought was not fully accurate. 
Also notable here is that a surprisingly large number of respondents (20.7 percent) said that 
they did not know if they had encountered news that was not accurate. In itself this might be a 
cause for concern because it reveals widespread uncertainty about the veracity of news on 
social media. When we exclude the group of individuals who did not know how to answer, well 
over half (57.7 percent) of British social media users reported that they saw inaccurate news on 
social media in the past month. 
It is clear that encountering inaccurate news is a very common experience on British social 
media. But what about sharing inaccurate news? 
 
6.1 Measuring Problematic News Sharing: Distinguishing Between Misinformation and 
Disinformation 
 
Asking people if they share false or misleading news is fraught with difficulty. Many people are 
likely to under-report this kind of behaviour, in part due to social desirability bias—the 
understandable motivation to avoid answering a survey question in a way that makes you look 
like a “bad person.” This is a particular problem with face-to-face surveys. With online surveys, 
social desirability bias still exists, but it has a weaker influence on people’s responses.16 When 
people respond to questions on a computer screen, they tend to be less concerned about how 
they come across than when they respond to questions from a person in the same room. 
Further problems here are, first, there is seldom a clear distinction between “good quality” 
14.7%
31.1%
11.9%
21.6%
20.7%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Often
Sometimes
Hardly ever
Never
I don't know
Sometimes people might post articles on social media that are not fully accurate. 
In the past month, how often did you come across news on social media that you 
thought was not fully accurate?
57.7% of UK social 
media users saw 
inaccurate news on social 
media in the past month
 O3C 1 / News Sharing on UK Social Media 14 
news and “poor quality” news; second, people may only become aware that the news they 
shared was false or misleading after they shared it, and, third, the context in which people 
share false or misleading information is important.17 
The closest thing to questions that are simple enough to use in a large-scale survey but 
nuanced enough to capture some of the range of people’s experiences when they share 
problematic news on social media comes from the Pew Research Center’s 2016 survey of 
news sharing.18  
Following Pew, our survey asked:  
 
“Sometimes people might share news on social media that turns out not to be fully 
accurate or is exaggerated. In the past month, do you recall sharing a news story that ...”  
 
§ Seemed accurate at the time, but you later found was made up 
§ Was exaggerated, and you were not aware of this 
§ Was exaggerated, and you were aware of this 
§ You thought was made up when you shared it 
 
 
Individuals could choose up to four responses, or no response if they did not recall sharing 
any problematic news. Respondents could choose more than one answer, so the percentages 
shown in Figure 6, below, total more than 100. 
When a person shares news that was exaggerated but they were not aware that it was 
exaggerated, or when a person shares news that seemed accurate at the time but they later 
found it was made up, our reasoning is that this is the lesser problem: it does not imply a bad 
intention in the original moment and it indicates a person at least bothered to make themselves 
aware that a news article was misleading after sharing it. We term these behaviours 
misinformation, because they are unintentional behaviour that inadvertently misleads. 
The other two potential responses capture the most problematic behaviours—sharing 
news that a person knew was exaggerated and sharing news that a person thought was made 
up when they shared it. Both of these are damaging for online civic culture, but the latter is 
particularly so, because it reveals a wilful attitude to misleading others. We term these 
behaviours disinformation because they are intentional behaviours that purposively mislead.19 
When asking about sharing false information, there is no such thing as the perfect survey 
question. These questions have the advantage that they allow people to express a number of 
different options on a continuum of possible behaviours and they are much more preferable to 
a blunter question that simply asks people if they “shared ‘fake news.’” 
We asked this question only of respondents who said that they shared news on social 
media at least once in the previous month, so the figures we report on pages 15–18 only refer 
to British news sharers on social media. 
 
6.2 The Extent of Problematic News Sharing Among Sharers 
 
As Figure 6 shows, 42.8 percent of news sharers on social media admitted at least one of the 
problematic news sharing activities we measured. Almost half of the British social media users 
who shared some news in the past month were willing to acknowledge that some of the news 
they shared was either false or exaggerated. This finding, in itself, speaks volumes about the 
current quality of public discourse on social media platforms. 
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If we drill down into the results, we can see some worrying findings. Fully 17.3 percent of 
those who share news on social media admitted to sharing news in the past month that they 
thought was made up when they shared it. This is the most problematic of the four news 
sharing behaviours we measured: it is knowingly engaging in 
disinformation and yet it was the most popular response to the 
question. This was contrary to our expectations. Before the 
survey, we reasoned that this question would receive the lowest 
response of the four options. We expected people to be more 
willing to select the responses that enabled them to express the 
ambiguity involved in sharing news about politics. To some 
extent, these shades of grey do exist, because relatively few (7.5 
percent) stated that they knowingly shared news that was 
exaggerated, while a larger number of news sharers (15.8 
percent) said they shared news that was exaggerated without being aware of it. But, overall, it 
should be a cause for concern that 17.3 percent of British news sharers on social media 
knowingly shared news that they thought was false. 
 
Figure 6. Problematic News Sharing on Social Media (N=589) 
 
 
* The total is more than 100 percent because respondents could choose more than one answer from among options 1, 2, 3, and 
4. 
 
6.3 Who Engages in Problematic News Sharing?  
 
What do we know about the demographic and political characteristics of those who tend to 
engage in problematic news sharing? On the next page, Figure 7a provides a social and 
political profile of British news sharers who engaged in disinformation—they admitted to sharing 
news that they knew was exaggerated or made up when they shared it. Figure 7b reports the 
same statistics for British news sharers whose actions resulted in misinformation—they shared 
news that either seemed accurate at the time but they later found was made up, or news that 
was exaggerated and they were not aware of this. 
 Figures 7a and 7b show that males are more likely than females to engage in 
disinformation when sharing news. Younger news sharers—those under the age of 45—are 
more likely to engage in both disinformation and misinformation than older groups. Those with 
higher levels of interest in politics appear to be more likely to engage in disinformation than 
those with lower levels of interest. Even though Conservative supporters are, on the whole, less 
likely to share news (as we showed above, in Figure 3), those Conservatives who do share 
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news are more likely than Labour supporters to admit to engaging in disinformation and 
misinformation when they share. Figures 7a and 7b also show that disinformation and 
misinformation are more common among those news sharers who identify with the right, the 
centre-right, and centre of the ideological spectrum, than among those who identify with the 
left or centre-left. 
 
Figure 7a. Social and Political Characteristics of News Sharers on Social Media who Engaged in 
Intentional Disinformation When Sharing News (N=589) 
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Figure 7b. Social and Political Characteristics of News Sharers on Social Media who Unintentionally 
Misinformed Others When Sharing News (N=589) 
 
 
 
 
7. The Promise—and the Reality—of Online Correction 
 
These findings might be of less concern if people who spread misinformation and 
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do. On the other hand, if corrections are not sufficiently widespread, it might indicate that there 
is an emerging cultural norm that “anything goes” when one shares news on social media. 
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Our survey revealed that corrective behaviour is not as common as we might expect. 
Figure 8 shows responses to our question:  
 
“In the past month, do you recall being told by anyone on social media that the news you 
shared on social media was not fully accurate or exaggerated?” 
  
§ I was told the news I had shared was completely made up 
§ I was told the news I had shared was not fully accurate 
§ I was told the news I had shared was exaggerated 
§ I do not recall any of these happened to me 
 
As with the question measuring disinformation and misinformation, this question was only 
asked of respondents who said they had shared news on social media at least once in the 
previous month. Respondents could choose more than one answer, so the percentages shown 
in Figure 8 add up to more than 100. 
 
Figure 8. Being Corrected by Others for Sharing Problematic News (N=589) 
 
  
* The responses total more than 100 percent because respondents could choose more than one from among options 1, 2, and 3. 
 
At first glance, it could be seen as heartening that two-thirds (66.2 percent) of those who 
shared news on social media did not recall being reprimanded for sharing news that was 
exaggerated, inaccurate, or false. This might be taken as a sign that problematic news sharing 
is not particularly widespread. And yet, as we showed in Figure 
6, above, problematic news sharing is widespread—42.8 
percent of British news sharers on social media admitted to at 
least one of our four types of problematic news sharing in the 
past month. What we therefore see in Figure 8 is that 
corrections appear to be significantly less common than 
problematic news sharing. For example, while we saw above 
(Figure 6) that 17.3 percent reported sharing news that they 
knew was made up when they shared it, here we see that only 9.7 percent reported having 
been told by anyone on social media that they had shared news that was made up. There is, 
therefore, an imbalance between the extent of problematic news sharing and the extent of its 
correction through reprimands. 
This finding about the relative sparsity of corrective action is reinforced if we consider the 
responses when we turned the tables to gauge the extent to which people had reprimanded 
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other social media users for their problematic news sharing. We asked: 
 
“In the past month, do you recall telling anyone on social media that the news they shared 
on social media was not fully accurate or exaggerated?” 
 
§ I told someone the news they had shared was completely made up 
§ I told someone the news they had shared was not fully accurate 
§ I told someone the news they had shared was exaggerated 
§ I do not recall telling any of those to anyone 
 
Unlike the previous question, we asked this question of all our respondents, irrespective of 
whether an individual had shared news on social media, so the percentages of the answers to 
the two questions are not fully comparable because they refer to different groups—British news 
sharers on social media for Figure 8 and British social media users for Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Correcting Other Social Media Users for Sharing Problematic News (N=2,005) 
 
 
* The responses total more than 100 percent because respondents could choose more than one from among options 1, 2, and 3. 
 
As Figure 9 shows, the vast majority (78.8 percent) of British social media users had not 
corrected other social media users for sharing news that was exaggerated, inaccurate, or false. 
Even the most problematic behaviour did not stimulate people to issue reprimands: only 8.5 
percent of British social media users reported calling out another social media user for sharing 
news that was made up. And only 11.3 percent performed the less socially-onerous task of 
telling someone that the news they shared was not fully accurate. 
This last finding is particularly surprising if we recall just how many social media users—
almost half—said that they saw problematic news on social media in the past month (see 
Figure 5, above). Clearly there is a mismatch between social media users’ experience of 
encountering problematic news sharing and their ability, or willingness, to do something about 
it. To some extent this is understandable. Criticising others is a socially demanding form of 
behaviour because the risks of receiving a negative response are substantial. But given that the 
disinhibition effects of social media apply just as much in this context as in others, we might 
expect to see more people engaging in corrective action. 
 
7.1 Who Corrects Others? 
 
As Figure 10 shows, overall, those who reprimand others for their problematic news sharing are 
11.3%
8.5%
5.5%
78.8%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
I told someone the news they had shared was not fully
accurate
I told someone the news they had shared was completely
made up
I told someone the news they had shared was exaggerated
I do not recall telling any of those to anyone
In the past month, do you recall telling anyone on social media that the news they 
shared on social media was not fully accurate or exaggerated?*
78.8% of UK 
social media 
users did not 
correct other 
users
 O3C 1 / News Sharing on UK Social Media 20 
more likely to be male, younger, have higher educational attainment, and be interested in 
politics. Conservative supporters are less likely than Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters to 
challenge others. Those on the ideological left are also marginally more likely to challenge 
others. Given our finding that Conservative supporters are more likely to share news that they 
knew was made up, it could be that Labour supporters and left-leaning individuals see it as a 
matter of political duty to try to set the record straight.21  
 
Figure 10. Characteristics of News Sharers on Social Media Who Corrected Other Social Media Users 
for Sharing Problematic News (N=2,005) 
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for engaging in misinformation and disinformation when they share news. As Figure 11 shows, 
about three quarters of respondents who admit to misinforming or disinforming also report 
being reprimanded by other social media users. This suggests that corrective behaviour is 
broadly aimed at the target that matters—those who are likely to share problematic news. 
 
Figure 11. The Relationship Between Sharing Problematic News and Being Corrected by Other Social 
Media Users (N=589) 
 
 
As Figure 12 shows, the profile of social media news sharers who were challenged broadly 
matches the profile of those who admit to misinforming or disinforming on social media: they 
tend to be male, younger, Conservative supporters, and ideologically on the right and centre-
right. These findings reinforce our previous observation that, although many social media users 
are not challenged by other users, the corrective action that occurs does at least seem to be 
aimed at the right target—the kinds of users who are more likely to share false or exaggerated 
news. 
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Figure 12. Characteristics of News Sharers on Social Media Who Were Corrected by Other Social 
Media Users for Sharing Problematic News (N=589) 
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media users for their problematic news sharing. Only a third (33.7 percent) of those who said 
they sometimes encounter problematic news said that they try to do something about it by 
telling the person who shared it on social media.  
 
Figure 13. The Relationship Between Seeing Problematic News and Correcting Other Social Media 
Users (N=1,590) 
 
 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This survey report has unearthed several troubling findings about the contribution of news 
sharing on social media to Britain’s online civic culture.  
Evidence of this kind ought to be considered in debates about the future role of social 
media platforms in British politics and society. But the evidence can also inform a broader 
debate about the role of all news media in the UK. Digital platforms differ in the extent to which 
their users engage with established, professional news organizations or online-native news. 
UK-specific evidence on this theme is currently unavailable, but evidence from the US indicates 
that the most engaged-with news on Facebook, for example, originates with a mix of online-
native and established brands.22 Much of the political news that is shared on social media is 
produced by professional news organizations. Clearly there is a problem of trust in social media 
platforms, but there is also a problem of trust in news more broadly.23 Our report’s most 
surprising finding is how this crisis of trust appears to be so quickly translating into widespread 
cynicism and a culture of “anything goes” among so many of those who engage in news 
sharing on social media. Cynicism is a difficult attitude to measure in a survey—it is pointless 
asking people the question “are you cynical?”24 But widespread evidence that people share 
news that they know is exaggerated or false when they share it should ring the alarm that 
cynicism has taken hold among a substantial minority of British social media users.  
This particularly survey does not allow us to say anything about the actual news stories 
that people tend to share when they misinform or disinform others, but false and misleading 
information is widespread on British social media and, for many, news sharing obviously plays a 
major role in its circulation. More than half of British social media users (57.7 percent) 
encountered news in the past month on social media that they thought was not fully accurate. 
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Among those who shared news on social media in the past month, 42.8 percent shared 
inaccurate or false news, and this included 17.3 percent who shared news they thought was 
made up when they shared it. In the UK, these social media users tend to be male, younger, 
and interested in politics. 
The so-called self-correcting nature of social media operates to some extent, but not as 
much as we might expect. A substantial amount of sharing on social media of inaccurate or 
made up news goes unchallenged. Fewer social media users (33.8 percent) report being 
corrected by other social media users than admit sharing false or exaggerated news (42.8 
percent). Far fewer social media users (21.2 percent) report correcting other social media users 
for sharing problematic news than report seeing problematic news on social media (57.7 
percent). And more than a quarter (26.4 percent) of those who shared inaccurate or made up 
news did not report being challenged by other social media users for doing so. The most 
problematic news sharing does not stimulate many social media users to correct the sharers: 
only 8.5 percent of British social media users said that they criticised another social media user 
for sharing news that was made up. On their own, UK-based initiatives to combat 
misinformation that rely on groups of social media users to correct others or flag false or 
inaccurate content might not, therefore, produce the desired outcomes. Ideology and partisan 
identity will clearly play a role in what kinds of misinformation individuals consider to be 
important enough to call out. But there is also a more general problem of declining trust, 
cynicism, and withdrawal.25 
Our survey revealed some partisan and ideological differences in sharing inaccurate or 
made up news on social media. Conservative supporters and those with right-wing ideological 
beliefs are more likely to share false or inaccurate news and to be reprimanded by others for 
doing so. Labour supporters, and those who hold left-wing ideological beliefs, are more likely to 
encounter inaccurate news and to correct other social media users for sharing inaccurate 
news. Our survey data cannot be used to explain the underlying reasons for this difference. It 
could be further evidence of Labour’s recent strategy of mobilizing its supporters on social 
media more generally, or it could be a reaction by Labour supporters to the influence of 
Britain’s largely right-leaning, non-public service news media.26 
These party differences aside, over the longer term, if the trends we identify in this report 
continue, many people are generally less likely to encounter the kind of interactions that might 
make a difference to the quality of the news they share. Over time, this situation may contribute 
to low levels of awareness on social media of the quality of different types of news and a 
damaging cultural norm that “anything goes” when sharing news online. If unchecked, this may 
make it more difficult to establish the minimal conditions required to distinguish truth from 
falsehood—conditions that enable citizens to engage in meaningful discussion across political 
divides. 
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